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Abstract 
The creation of multi-owned, strata titled housing occurs as a legal mechanism at the 
time local and state governments accept and approve the developer’s survey plans. 
Economic and social forces allow the creation of an organisation by people who 
have little ongoing interest in its ability to function. From an organisational viewpoint, 
this is a unique situation.  
  
When an owner buys into a strata complex, they cede power to the owner 
organisation that controls the common property within the apartment or master 
planned estate. This occurs through contract mechanisms at the point of sale. Set 
within a structure and agency framework, this review of literature moves the focus 
from planning and legal considerations and the actors voice, to the formation of an 
organisation. It considers whether a new type of hybrid organisation has been 
created in which governance, transparency and accountability are hampered by the 
legal framework that is set up to protect it.  
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 Introduction 
 
The growth of private cities, master planned communities and apartment complexes are 
recognised as a global phenomena. From the Purple Jade compound in China  (Wu 2006) to 
Buenos Aires (Janoschka and Borsdorf 2006), Russia (Lentz 2006), South Africa (Jurgens 
and Landman 2006), England (Blandy, Dixon et al. 2006), USA (McKenzie 1996; Frantz 
2006; Le Groix 2006; Lentz 2006; and Australia (Sherry 2009), the urban spread of privately 
governed neighbourhoods, estates and apartments have been widely commented on by 
urban planners and housing theorists (Thuillier 2006, Le Goix 2006).  For many academics, 
it is the spatial spread of these phenomena that is crucial. Others are interested in the 
reasons why this form of housing has arisen and linked it to issues of fear and segregation 
(Low 2003), economic rationalism (Nelson 2002; Webster and Glasze 2006), growth of 
middle class elitism (Foldvary 2006), issues of private governance (Atkinson and Blandy 
2006; Blandy and Lister 2006; McKenzie 1996) and the need for more dense, 
environmentally friendly cities.  
 
The academic literature provides insight into a range of aspects relevant to the multi-owned 
housing environment. This paper reviews the academic literature, considers the influences 
that create the organisation, and how these impact on the organisation’s ability to function in 
an Australian context. Literature gaps are considered, and consideration is given as to 
whether a unique organisation has been created. However first, there is a need to provide a 
working definition of multi-owned housing. 
 
Defining multi-owned housing  
 
McKenzie (2006) and Glasze (2006), use different terminology to provide definitions for a 
range of multi-owned housing types. However Blandy, Dupuis and Dixon (2010) introduce 
the generic term ‘multi-owned housing’ to encompass a number of different forms of housing 
organisation containing similar, shared governance structures. The term provides a generic 
background to the discussion of shared governance structures within the real property 
sphere.  
 
Two types of multi-owned housing are excluded from this discussion. Firstly, the trading of 
intangible property shares are excluded. Glasze (2006) refers to these as ‘stock 
corporations’. Where a company owns the total property with owner-shareholders 
purchasing a ‘block’ of shares and the right to occupy a particular dwelling, intangible shares 
are traded. Up until the 1961 this was the only type of multi-owned housing available in 
Australia (Butler-Bowden and Pickett 2007).  
 
Also excluded, are forms of housing in which prospective owners come together to create a 
deliberate community with shared values.  In co-operative housing, there is a deliberate 
intention to build a community through consensus, maximised prior to purchase.  Beito, 
Gordon and Tabarrok’s (2002) ‘voluntary city’ most closely equates with this type of 
consensus built housing. In the Australian context this possibility still exists through other 
forms of legislation, though it remains a minor part of the housing market. McKenzie (2006) 
has commented on the disjunct between the global discourse around the rise of multi-owned 
housing, society’s need for more inclusive communities, and dwindling forms of consensus 
built housing. 
 
The discussion then, is centred on multi-owned housing that occurs when real property is 
sold to more than one owner, with each owner retaining ownership over his or her private 
real property, while at the same time retaining an interest in elements common to more than 
one owner. Because owners retain an interest at the individual and collective level, this type 
of housing is often referred to as strata titled property. As such it applies to residential and 
commercial realty, master planned estates, apartments complexes, gated communities, 
retirement and lifestyle villages and in some countries, whole cities.  Strata titled 
developments are initiated by the developer for the purpose of on-selling individual real 
property units for profit.  The owner may on-sell their real property along with their interest in 
the common property without reference to other owners within the complex. In Australia, the 
mechanism is equivalent to McKenzie’s (2006) explanation of ‘condominium type’ 
development, though not exclusive to apartment dwellings. It is on multi-owned property 
created through the strata title mechanism that this paper concentrates. 
 
All property formed under this type of multi-owned or strata mechanism is legally connected 
to a committee of management via legislation. For the purposes of this paper, the 
management committee is referred to as an ‘owner corporation’, though the term differs 
between states, for example in New South Wales, the term ‘body corporate’ applies. Multi-
owned housing complexes are influenced by the collective ownership of amenities and 
membership to a governing body that creates enforceable legal rights and duties between 
owners (Blandy et al 2010, Sherry 2009).  
 
Sherry (2009, p. 133) has succinctly identified three major concepts within owner 
corporations as:  
 collective ownership of common property; 
 creation of rules that govern behaviour within the complex and 
 creation of a governing body to control administration of the common property. 
Included as part of the administrative controls are items such as raising levies from the 
owners to undertake maintenance and cover insurance costs. The three concepts of 
collective ownership, rule making ability and control through a governing body remain 
universal for multi-owned housing.  
 
Definitions of common property are difficult. The Victorian state legislation defines common 
property as ‘land shown as common property on a plan of subdivision or a plan of strata or 
cluster subdivision’ (Owners Corporations Act 2006, Act No. 69/2006 Victoria). In practice, 
areas between and separating each unit, such as wall cavities, roof, roof space, air above 
the roof, and the building facade may be included within the common property. Other areas 
may include gardens, car spaces and driveways, stairwells, lifts, security and air conditioning 
systems, electrical and fire connections. In master planned or gated communities the 
common property may include parkland, water, sewerage and roads. The range of items 
included as common property may make it difficult for prospective purchasers and owners to 
understand where their exclusive ownership ends and the common property begins, putting 
power in the hands of professional plan readers such as engineers, surveyors and strata 
property managers. Moreover older complexes may not have designated common property 
on the survey plans because the common property was prescribed in the legislation at the 
time the scheme was created, creating a costly legal quagmire for owners. As McKenzie 
(2010) states, the metastasizing body of law creates difficulties for owners.  
 
Committee and Organisational Considerations 
 
It is increasing acknowledged that the creation of a governing body with explicit duties, 
including the ability to make rules to govern behaviour has created a fourth layer of 
government (Blandy, Dixon et al. 2006; Sherry 2009; McKenzie 2010; Randolph 2010). 
Glasze (2006) believes that privatisation of neighbourhoods is a shift from an omnipotent 
state to a minimal state, placing decision making closest to those affected. He describes it as 
a ‘new territorial organisation on a sub-local level which enables the exclusive consumption 
of collective goods and in which political decisions are taken in a shareholder democracy’. At 
the very least, it fulfils Clegg, et al’s (2006, p. 1) definition of an organisation as ‘the 
collective bending of individual wills to a common purpose’ and Robbins Bergman et al’s 
(2009, p. 57) definition of an organisation as a ‘deliberate arrangement of people to 
accomplish some specific purpose’. The legal structure and authority creates a purpose 
driven organisation.  
 
Strata title mechanisms create an organisation and give it shape through a committee 
structure (McKenzie 1996; Jurgens and Landman 2006). The committee structure enables 
the owner corporation to function in a collective manner and meet its legislated, private 
governance duties. Owners are given voice through the committee structure. The following 
figure indicates the organisational structure as defined through legislation in the Australian 
context. Committee member numbers differ between jurisdictions. It should be noted 
however that sub committees may exist at the behest of owners, or be mandatory as a result 
of the schedules lodged against the property title by the developer. For example the 
Docklands precinct in Melbourne, Victoria has at least twenty-four developer initiated sub-
committees.  Developers influence the owner corporation structure and therefore functioning 
of the owner corporation. 
 
 
Figure 1, Legal structure of the owner corporation 
 
The raising and spending of funds for long and short term repair and maintenance are all 
subject to the committee’s approval. So to, is the creation of by-laws for the smooth 
functioning of the complex. The natural range of owner views creates conflict and power 
plays within the organisation. Viewing the organisational structure in this way, allows us to 
more clearly see how Glasze’s (2006) micro political aspects and contestation of power 
within the organisation may arise. For Clegg et al (2006, p. 2) power is central to all 
organisations stating ‘we cannot make an enquiry into organisations without an enquiry into 
power’.  
 Feng’s research (2008 in Blandy et al 2010, p. 134) indicates that it is not unusual for new 
resident committees to face multiple serious neighbourhood problems involving developers, 
local government, property managers and home owners. Certainly McKenzie (1996; Glasze 
2006; Jurgens and Landman 2006) comments on the growing conflict experienced within 
owner corporations. Brackertz and Kenley (2002, p. 127) report that local governments have 
difficulty managing their facilities strategically and operate within an environment of inherent 
distrust where change is rarely welcomed. Likewise, common property facilities such as fire 
services, air conditioning, roads and similar items are costly, commercial in nature and 
require professional asset management. Owner corporations have similar difficulties in 
convincing owners of the need for strategic business management. McKenzie (2010) goes 
further stating that much of the conflict and power play within the organisation can be 
attributed to untrained volunteers undertaking what are essentially municipal duties in their 
spare time. 
 
Multi-owned housing management committees are hampered not only by their untrained 
volunteer nature, but also by the duality of purpose that each owner experiences.  Owners 
are torn between their needs as individual home owners, and the need to address collective 
good and long term needs. Volunteer owner-committees struggle with issues of participation, 
governance, transparency, accountability, trust and control (Blakely and Snyder 1999). The 
participatory nature of committees may cause delay in decision making through the need to 
negotiate outcomes, increased conflict and cost. Chen and Webster (2006) found that when 
levels of trust decreased among owner corporations, the level of buy in decreased leading to 
fewer participants within the owner corporation environment. They cite Gao (1999) who 
reported that participants ‘drew lots’ in order to appoint committee members, since no-one 
volunteered.  There are similarities to Bush and Gamage’s (2001) discussion of school 
boards which found that the provision of governance was a volunteer activity with no 
extrinsic rewards resulting in difficulty attracting suitable candidates. Time spent volunteering 
for an owner corporation is rarely recognised or valued by on-lookers, though it is as 
essential as it is mandatory. 
 
Bush and Gamage (2001) raise an important point. For school parent and friend 
associations, the volunteer labour comes from a wider society and is not confined to parents 
of existing pupils. Yet still they have difficulty fielding sufficient committee members. 
Membership within an owner corporation is compulsory and quite static. Committee 
members are selected from existing owners, not the wider community. Membership numbers 
are limited by the number of dwellings contained within the complex, and relies on property 
sale to renew membership from new owners. Proxy voting is limited or banned within some 
complexes. Within Australia, the strata industry’s policy is to ban onlookers from committee 
meetings (OCV 2010) effectively limiting transparency and stymieing opposition. From an 
organisational perspective, this is a unique situation. The organisation has closed 
membership, no say over who becomes a member, and is still expected to function in an 
altruistic manner to provide municipal like duties and in doing so act with transparency and 
accountability. The limited membership and proxy voting rights, adversely affects the 
organisation’s ability to function. 
 
McKenzie (1996; Silverman & Barton 1994) note that within western constitutions principles 
of public and pluralistic decision making and principles of equity and sovereignty exist at 
national, state and municipal levels. However these are violated at the owner corporation 
level. Scott (1999) notes that competing interests and missing democratic institutions are out 
of balance within them. Glasze (2006, p. 41) highlights three ways in which democratic 
principles may be violated by ‘private governments’: 
 At higher levels of government, representatives are not bound to property ownership 
or place of residence. Tenants have voting rights. 
 Institutional opposition exists at higher levels of government whereas owner 
corporation committee members determine the agenda through privileged access to 
information.  
 ‘Dictatorial and oligarchic’ structures exist in which developers may dominate 
decision making in owner corporations. 
 
However, at higher levels of government, representatives and board members are paid, not 
voluntary.  As organisations, rather than fourth tier governments, owner corporations have a 
considerable amount in common with not-for-profit (NFP) organisations, also reliant on 
volunteers. Moreover, in the western world, governments are set up through democratic 
processes, not by one person, the developer, having total say over the governing 
documents, as in the case of the owner corporation.  
 
Within the Australian setting, there are other indications that owner corporations should be 
treated as organisations. In Australia, incorporation does not allow large estates to secede 
from the municipality as appears to be the case in America (Blakely & Snyder 1999, 
McKenzie 2006). Secondly, for owner corporation seeking to claim back goods and services 
tax (GST), the Australian Taxation Office (ATO) has provided owner corporations with not-
for-profit (NFP) status up to a threshold of $150,000 where they do not intend to distribute 
non-mutual income. Moreover, ATO ruling IT 2505 clarified the tax treatment of income from 
owner corporations (Australian Taxation Office 2010). The ruling views income from 
members (typically strata levies) as mutual income and therefore not taxable in the hands of 
the owners corporation. However income derived from common property (e.g. parking, gym 
hire, interest on levies) is considered a taxable event though income is used for the upkeep 
of common areas. The ruling applies the principles of mutuality determining that non-mutual 
income is taxable in the hands of the individual lot owners rather than the owners 
corporation. The ruling means that even though profits may never be distributed to the 
owners, the owners are required to declare income from belonging to the owner corporation 
(www.ato.gov.au/rulings accessed 11/4/2011), thus putting the income on the same basis as 
income from privately held intangible shares trading income. The effect of the ruling is to 
require larger owner corporation to provide an annual income statement to each owner for 
their use in end of year financial statements, a time consuming activity for volunteer 
committee members.  
 
At an individual level, the annual income statement creates an additional burden for owners, 
particularly those on fixed incomes or reliant on pensions. They need to declare the income, 
even though it remains within the sinking funds of the owner corporation, and they cannot 
individually access it. Moreover since individual owner income levels are artificially raised, 
individual owners may be unable to access low income subsidies such as reduced water, 
electricity and municipal rate subsidies.  The existing tax legislation impacts on owner 
corporation members in ways that owning freehold property does not, and places it as a NFP 
organisation. 
 
At an organisational level, the distribution of funds requirement may act to limit the amount of 
income sought through rental of common property or act as a disincentive for owner 
corporations to save for periodic maintenance renewal, one of their key responsibilities.  
More importantly however, the owner corporation NFP status means that it can compete for 
community funding against other NFP organisations. The impact on other community 
organisations has not been investigated. 
 
Structure considerations and the organisation 
 
Government agencies, banks, insurance companies, construction industry, and developers 
all seek to influence the macro political agenda. The economic health of these industries is 
frequently commented on as an indicator of national economic health. It is no wonder when 
the construction and associated industries provide 9% of Australia’s employment and 
contribute $160 billion to Australia’s economy annually (Master Builders Association 2011). 
Banks and insurance companies provide finance and risk mitigation for the construction and 
developer driven industries, federal and state jurisdictions advocate for urban renewal of 
inner city areas and approve legislation. Bounds and Morris (2006) investigated Sydney’s 
inner city urban renewal and found that it was large-scale in nature, stimulated by the state 
and led by private developers. Collectively, the banking, insurance and construction industry 
create a formidable political lobbying force at the macro level. Figure 2 groups the four major 
players within one circle of influence.  
 
Legislative mechanisms provide a framework for the creation of privatised complexes and 
subdivisions. Population pressures feed federal and state policy for higher density (Randolph 
2010). Politicians are lobbied to create frameworks that benefit special interest groups.  
Within the Australian context, the strata title mechanism was championed by developer Lend 
Lease, whose founder Dusseldorp, engaged a private solicitor to write Australia’s first strata 
legislation and present it to the NSW government (Butler-Bowden & Pickett 2007). 
Developers sold the legislation to politicians on the basis that it would provide low cost 
housing, a view increasingly negated by the high maintenance costs of the commercially 
constructed buildings and infrastructure they contain.  
 
 
Figure 2, Structural influences in multi-owned housing 
 
At the local level, councils, developers, real estate agents and the strata industry combine to 
create a second circle of influence impacting on the owner corporation, also shown in Figure 
2. The strata industry is supported through sponsorship deals provided by banking and 
insurance industries, and may take trailing fees for products sold. The strata industries’ role 
is to provide lobbying on behalf of professional property managers of multi-owned housing 
and contribute to the growth of the industry. Owners remain unrepresented and have no 
political voice. Real estate agents sell property on behalf of the developer. Jurgens and 
Landman (2006) report that estate agents are a key influence in rise of multi-owned housing. 
Councils, developers, strata managers and real estate agents create macro level political 
influence in the creation of multi-owned housing developments. Figure 2 (above) depicts the 
two groups of four key structural influences on the owner corporation’s formation and 
functioning.  
 
Market economies have allowed the creation of new privatised services that filled the void in 
service provision previously held by government within a contract environment (Ernst, 
Glanville et al. 1997). The fiscal constraints faced by state and local governments required 
new approaches to invest in major infrastructure (McKenzie 1996; Blandy 2010; Sherry 
2009) at a time when banks began to lend more liberally to the private sector. To reduce 
financial impacts, municipalities were forced into contracting for services with each other and 
with the private sector (Brackertz and Kenley 2002).  Profit seeking private sector developers 
were able to market new products to cash strapped municipalities in the form of privatised 
housing estates and apartment buildings (McKenzie 2006).  McKenzie (1996; Blakely & 
Snyder 1999) advised that local governments encourage the establishment of private 
‘neighbourhoods’.  Some, including Las Vegas, have banned all other types of development, 
McKenzie (2006) reports.  
 
For cash strapped municipalities, multi-owned housing is desirable. Finance for the 
infrastructure is paid by the developer (Curtin 2000) who recoups the upfront capital costs 
through the purchase price. Ongoing maintenance for infrastructure and services is placed in 
the hands of owners through the owner corporation structure (Le Goix 2006, p. 137).  
Moreover, the developer pays additional fees to the municipality for planning approval, and 
for the waiving of some planning edicts. At the same time the number of rateable properties 
increases. For inner city municipalities, vertical apartment complexes may be the only way to 
increase the number of rateable properties. The owners, through their owner corporation 
may be double charged for services such as garbage collection, once through the 
organisations levy system and once through the rates paid to the municipality for a service 
that they do not receive, creating a saving for the municipality. In this instance, far from 
being predators of public resources as Foldvary (2006) suggests, owner corporations are 
contributing to the financial functioning of a public system they may be unable to access. 
Thuillier (2006, p. 75; Blakely & Snyder 1999) indicate that some owners are reluctant to pay 
their share of local council taxes for this reason. Private multi-owned housing may decrease 
the usage of public goods while increasing the number of rateable properties.  
 
Local government and developers may conspire to provide a supply driven economy through 
limiting approval of free hold housing (McKenzie 2006). When this occurs housing choice is 
diminished. Consumers may purchase in these developments because no other option is 
available, rather than for fear, seclusion or economic reasons. Franz’s (2006; Low 2003; 
Webster & Glasze 2006) assumption of voluntary participation in governance structures set 
up through this legal mechanism is voided in supply driven economies. Moreover Foldvary’s 
(1994) assertion that private communities are not free riders on the public purse because 
they are paying privately for the items they choose to use is not valid either. In supply driven 
housing situations, people are paying for their ‘dwelling’ and as Blandy and Lister (2006) put 
it, and the centrality of location set within a wider community, without necessarily seeking the 
additional facilities supplied by the developer and may actively avoid using them.  
 
Moreover the objectification of ‘home’ as a consumer good has allowed place marketing by 
developers and the real estate industry. The idea of ‘community’ is sold, despite no evidence 
to support its’ existence (Blakely & Snyder 1999). At the same time, estate agents fail to 
mention the administrative aspects attached to governing common property. Academic 
discourse around private estates assumes a knowledgeable and discerning consumer in 
which prospective purchasers choose certain neighbourhoods because of the products 
supplied (Low 2003; Foldvary 2006; Chen & Webster 2006) however there is little evidence 
to support this. Blandy and Lister (2006) interviewed residents six months after moving into 
their multi-owned housing estate and found that some residents were unaware of the 
governing structure, or their role in it. 
 
Within Australia, some states such as Tasmania, have no requirement for the vendor to 
provide access to a full set of governing documents at the point of sale. In other states such 
as Victoria, legislation mandates that the purchaser is provided with full documentation; 
however these documents may not be understood to be part of the contractual obligation by 
the purchaser. The purchaser may not be notified that by signing the ‘contract for sale’ 
documents, he or she is contractually bound to third party obligations with the other owners. 
Graw (2005) reports that one of the essential elements of any contract is ‘the intention to be 
bound’, however there is no requirement for estate agents to draw attention to the 
organisation, or shared assets. This is a key failure of the strata title system in the Australian 
context. How real estate legislation affects the owner corporation is not well understood by 
academics seeking to understand and work with owner corporations. 
 The developer, the organisation, and legislation 
 
The owner corporation is created on paper as a legal mechanism by the developer prior to 
any building taking place, placing the developer in a unique position of influence over the 
owner corporation and its members. McKenzie (2006) states that the contract structure over 
which the developer has primary influence, is convoluted and may contain many hundreds of 
pages of legal documents. They comprise the sale documents, by-laws, schedules to the 
title, and covenants over the title, the title documents and legislative constraints that rely on 
professional expertise to decipher. These are overlaid by planning constraints contained 
within a different set of legislation.  
 
McKenzie (1996) noted that American legislation skewed the developers influence by 
allowing them hold the balance of voting power while owning as little as seventeen percent 
of properties. Similar mechanisms exist in Australia and are designed to protect the 
developer’s profit margin. While the developer has control of the owner corporation, he has 
the ability to set in place third party contracts with property managers, maintenance, 
landscaping and cleaning contractors. The developer may also negotiate contracts on behalf 
of the owner corporation to lease out facilities such as gymnasiums to third parties at this 
stage. Where third party contracts are given to other developer controlled companies, it 
creates a conflict of interest situation to the detriment of the functioning organisation.  
 
The developer can appoint themselves to be the owner corporation property managers 
(Blandy 2010). This practice has been outlawed in some but not all Australian states. 
However legislative changes have not moved to rescind existing property management 
contracts of this type and there are still a number of complexes and estates that experience 
ongoing difficulties due to the conflict of interest it creates. Docklands is a case in point. The 
owner corporation is hampered in its ability for self determination by contracts formed in this 
way. 
 
Developers may retain ownership to the gym or golf course and then rent it out at market 
prices to the general public, affecting property prices within the development and exclusivity 
of the property (Glasze 2006). Such a move by the developer limits the owner corporation’s 
ability to gain rental from key facilities which may be needed to assist in maintaining the 
facilities. Pouder and Clark (2009) noted that strategic planning along these lines was often 
essential to maintain funds for asset renewal.  
 Glasze (2006) reports that developers may dominate the decision making within an owner 
corporation by retaining ownership to a portion of the properties and influence decision 
making into the future as a home owner, or by making use of the proxy voting where 
available. The developer in this instance has a privileged position within the owner 
corporation. The complex nature of the governing documents are such that the developer 
may be the only person on the committee of management that understands the full impact of 
a given decision.   
Summary and conclusion 
Multi-owned housing may be a global phenomenon, however the experience will differ 
between countries.  Academics have commented on the internal organisational conflict, 
however because the owner corporation is seen as a fourth level of government, little 
research on inter-organisational conflict, funding mechanisms, governance strengthening or 
resource management has occurred. 
 
While there are commonalities in the governing documents and the part that developers and 
municipalities play, there are also significant differences between jurisdictions. The three 
concepts of collective ownership, rule making ability and control through a governing body 
as defined by Sherry (2009) remain universal. Though many may consider the owner 
corporation to be a fourth level of government, in Australian law, it remains a not-for-profit 
organisation. The impact of this status on owners and tenants is little understood. The 
impact on other NFP organisations has not been considered, nor has the impact on the 
volunteer workforce. The Australian taxation regime is punitive towards larger complexes 
maintaining municipal like infrastructure.  Where complexes are not maintained, and 
developers force the standards required in covenants to be met, owners are may be faced 
with escalating periodic levy payments at the behest of the developer, or be forced by other 
owners to agree to demolition of the whole complex, thus playing into the hands of 
developers needing more land for greater profit. The impact of inconsistencies with other 
legislation is not understood. 
 
A number of ways that developers are able to influence the formation and performance of 
the owner corporation organisation have been highlighted throughout this paper. Firstly they 
influence the legislative and political processes and the formation of policy to their 
advantage. Lend Lease’s drafting of strata title legislation is a case in point (Butler-Bowden 
& Pickett 2007). Secondly, developers conspire with municipalities to create a supply driven 
economy in multi-owned dwellings (Blakely & Snyder 1999, McKenzie 2006). As Blandy & 
Lister (2006) noted, owners pay for additional goods within the strata complex which they 
may have no need for but are required to maintain. Developers determine the amount of 
common property, which in turn influences the amount of levies payable for maintenance 
and replacement. Thirdly, developers determine the standard to which property is built. 
Cheap construction methods wear out more quickly and are less flexible in meeting 
changing societal needs. Properties outlive their useful life and require demolition more 
quickly. Fourthly, as McKenzie (2006) noted, developers determine the legal and contractual 
documents. Included in this is the apportioning of votes and percentage of levies paid per 
dwelling. Developers also determine the boundaries between private and common 
properties within the legal documents and through applying covenants, determine the 
standard to which the property is maintained or initial set of bylaws as part of this stage 
(Blakely and Snyder 1999). This fourth way that developers influence the owner corporation 
is equivalent to the first of Blandy’s (2010) type developer influence. Fifthly, as noted 
previously, developers may determine the number and type of sub-committees, influencing 
the committee structure, and the number of volunteers required to operate the owner 
corporation. Together, developers influence the governing structure. A sixth way that 
developers may influence the owner corporation is by appointing themselves to be the 
property manager for the complex.  This is equivalent to the second of Blandy’s (2010) two 
type developer influence. Associated with this, is the developer’s ability to set up multiple 
third party contracts on advantageous terms (for the developer), limiting the owner 
corporation’s ability for self determination. This is a seventh way that developers influence 
owner corporations adversely. An eighth way that developers may adversely affect the 
owner corporation is by remaining an owner through the performing stage of the 
organisation. This enables the developer to sit on the committee as an owner. The developer 
may be the only person on the committee able to fully comprehend the governing documents 
and the ramifications of the decisions made. Finally, developers influence the owner 
corporation through marketing campaigns. As Blakely and Snyder (1999) report, real estate 
agents sell the emotion of home not the associated owner corporation. By failing to mention 
the governing documents in the marketing material, the developer and his estate agent, 
influence people to purchase without understanding third party contractual relationships with 
other owners.   
 
Against this backdrop of structural forces, owners are given limited autonomy of their 
complexes. They have no institutional opposition. Owners are provided with a structure 
within which to operate, but not versed in how to run an organisation, nor can they 
significantly change the organisational structure or increase membership. Yet they are 
expected to manage increasingly large financial sums and commercial assets within a 
transparent and accountable framework without being versed in governance, financial or 
property knowledge. Owners may not have been told when purchasing that they are joining 
an organisation, have obligations towards it, need to adhere to by-laws, or provide volunteer 
labour for the organisation. The balance between individual and collective decision making 
within the organisation is not always understood as a conflict of interest. Personal conflicts 
that beset the organisation provide a sense of powerlessness that contrasts with intended 
benefits of participation. Participation dwindles as trust and transparency is lowered, and no 
effective opposition occurs to provide a balanced view of decisions and decision making. 
Owners, who are able to, may move away (Blakely & Snyder 1999) taking organisational 
knowledge with them. Hampered on so many fronts, the organisation may not be able to 
recover and function effectively, move from the organisational forming stage to the 
performing stage, since the organisational attributes are unique and hampered by the very 
framework that is setup to ensure its functioning.  
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